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The Law of the Sea:
Alliances and Divisive Issues
In International Ocean Negotiations
JUDITH TEGGER KILDOW*
INRODUCTION
Throughout history, the oceans have played a major role in geo-
politics. Nations states have depended on the seas for their eco-
nomies, for political power and for military effectiveness. The
critical importance of the oceans is once again reflected in national
and international arenas. Freedom of the seas and resource man-
agement for the oceans have become two major issue areas, bring-
ing some nations into conflict while creating new alliances between
other states.
Institutions created and those which evolved to provide some
order in the oceans are beginning to falter. Old functions and
relationships are appearing outmoded or incapable of handling new
problems. Why? An unprecedented rate of change has character-
ized the past several decades and is having an impact on the
operations of international as well as national institutions. While
* Assistant Professor of Ocean Policy Department of Ocean Engineer-
ing Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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many of these changes are difficult to perceive and understand
without the benefit of historical perspective, much of the change
seems to be attributable to scientific discovery and technological
innovation.
Change is normally made apparent to us through the operation
of political, economic and other social structures and processes.
However, the accelerative rate of recent technological change has
placed heavy burdens on this system of institutions and processes,
which have not demonstrated the capability of changing at a com-
mensurate rate.
Recent concern with ocean affairs is partially a manifestation
of the inability of social institutions to keep up with other changes
in the system; it is a real confrontation of "have" and "have not"
nations; it is a symbollic attempt to change age-old patterns of
resource distribution. A number of interesting conditions, which
evolved for several decades, converged during the 1960's to create
these circumstances, and as a consequence, a focal point for inter-
national debate and conflict.
Among these conditions were: 1) heightened awareness of the
potentials for wealth from the sea; 2) availability of technological
capabilities to exploit that wealth; 3) a volatile political condition
of rising nationalism throughout the international system. This
latter situation was partially a result of the increase in newly
independent states over the past several decades as well as to
continued nationalism in the older, more developed states.
As a consequence of the large number of states newly born over
the past twenty years, memberships in international bodies have
swollen, diluting and diminishing the political power which en-
abled the Great Powers to dominate those bodies. The result:
a de-emphasis of Great Power politics in these organizations.
Added to this situation was the change in the relative international
economic position of the United States, which began to occur in
the 1960's-or at least became apparent at that time-in which its
balance of trade position and the strength of the dollar appeared
to weaken. The problems and fears created by these changing cir-
cumstances have produced policies in the United States which em-
phasize domestic development over foreign programs. The result
has been a gradual de-emphasis on future foreign aid programs
and a gradual withdrawal from others currently underway.
There has also been a change in cold war politics between the
Soviet Union and the United States, once manifested in competition
for the loyalties of the developing states, and evidenced in foreign
assistance programs. With the waning of sharp competitive poli-
tics between the two Great Powers has come an accompanying
decrease in importance attributed to financial and technical aid
programs to the developing world (leaving military assistance
aside).
The growing importance of the oceans for military operations
cannot be neglected. An arms race is taking place beneath the
seas. Polarises, Poseidons, and Tridents, tracking systems and oth-
er weapons are becoming increasingly significant as mobility of
defense systems gains importance. While economic and political
hostilities have diminished between the two Great Powers, military
matters remain critically important. With national security at
stake between them, control of the seas remains a vital policy ob-
jective.1
The diverse implications of all the events and circumstances
enumerated in the preceding pages all come up against an inade-
quate institutional structure for managing the oceans.
The decision-making apparatus for the oceans includes a multi-
tude of international as well as national mechanisms. The inter-
national mechanisms have a primary function of keeping order and
promoting international cooperation through information transfers
and some attempts at regulation. However, national mechanisms
are presumably there to assure the protection of certain national
interests. The potential conflicts existing between these two levels
of authority often stymie international organizations from carrying
out significant functions. In the case of international ocean insti-
tutions, some are more effective than others, although none seems
to be highly successful according to any set of standards, except
perhaps longevity of life. However, those which are more effective
than others seem to be under the influence of a relatively small
number of men (less than 100) who have known and worked with
each other for a long time; men, who almost without exception,
represent the industrialized states. Until very recently, only a
handful of nations had any large vested interests in the oceans
beyond coastal areas. However, things are rapidly changing as food,
energy sources and other raw materials become less abundant,
while demand for them and their value continue to grow. Thus,
1. Kildow, The Seas: Heritage for the Few or Hope for the Many,
(Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea
Institute, 1972).
[VOL. 11:558, 1974] International Ocean Negotiations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
many nations, not just a few, are demanding a share of the re-
sources in the oceans, or revenue from them. Yet, most of these
nations have had little to do or say about development or distribu-
tion of the ocean's resources up to now. With much of the effec-
tiveness of ocean policy-making machinery dependent upon an al-
most "old crony" atmosphere, the entrance into the scene of more
than 150 nations with accompanying demands for more representa-
tion have made change imperative.
A SKETCH OF RECENT EVENTs
Although U.S. officials, recognizing the importance of ocean pol-
icy, had debated the area for some years, and while there had been
some activity in the U.N. on this subject during the early 1960's,
1967 really marked the beginning of the current flurry of ocean
activities in the United Nations. The already famous speech before
the United Nations General Assembly in 1967, of Mr. Arvid Pardo,
at the time Ambassador from Malta to the United Nations, gave
impetus to the introduction in the agenda of the U.N. General As-
sembly the item concerning the peaceful uses of the sea-bed beyond
national jurisdiction.
The General Assembly examined this item at its twenty-second
session and adopted resolution 2340 (XXII) establishing an Ad Hoc
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the SeaBed and the Ocean
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, composed of 35
States. In that connexion, the Ad Hoc Committee was requested
to prepare a study which would include a survey of past and pres-
ent activities of the United Nations and other intergovernmental
bodies with regard to the sea-bed and ocean floor, and of existing
international agreements concerning those areas; an account of the
scientific, technical, economic, legal, and other aspects of the item;
and an indication as to practical means of promoting international
cooperation in the exploration, conservation and use of the sea-
bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, as contemplated
in the title of the item, and of their resources.2
... At its twenty-third session, on December 21, 1968, the General
Assembly adopted four resolutions, resolutions 2467 A, B, C and
D (XXIII) establishing the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction and outlining in effect its future work.3
... In addition to the Declaration of Principles adopted as resolu-
tion 2749 (XXV), the Assembly adopted resolution 2750C, under
2. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, VoL 1, No.
21 (A/9021), p. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Committee].
3. Id. at 2.
which it decided to convene in 1973, in accordance with the pro-
visions of paragraph 3 of that resolution .. a conference on the
law of the sea which would deal with the establishment of an
equitable international regime-including an international mach-
inery-for the area and the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean
floor, and the subsoil thereof; beyond the limits of national juris-
diction, a precise definition of the area, and a broad range of re-
lated issues, including those concerning the regimes of the high
seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea (including the ques-
tion of its breadth and the question of international straits) and con-
tiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the
high seas (including the question of the preferential rights of coastal
states), the preservation of the marine environment (including,
inter alia, the prevention of pollution), and scientific research. 4
A brief review of the history of the Sea-bed Committee shows
a large increase in the membership over a short period of time.
The Ad Hoc committee had only 35 members, the permanent com-
mittee had 41 members at its inception but was enlarged to 85
within the year.5
Objectively, it is easy to see the difficulty of the task of reaching
satisfactory compromise on numerous issues among so many
states. In 1974, the entire membership of the United Nations will
meet jointly in an attempt to reach resolution to key issues. What-
ever the outcome, compromise among so many nations with so
many interests can be at best the least common denominators but
certainly nothing of a revolutionary nature.
In 1970, preparatory meetings for the Law of the Sea Conference
began. These meetings have provided the arena for broad discus-
sions regarding the oceans. They have been the forum in which
strange alliances and voting blocs of nations have formed.
THE NATURE OF BLOCS AND THE BARGAINING PROCESS
The formation of blocs of nations in any international arena
has some fundamental principles. However, the purpose for form-
ing blocs is an important variable to be considered here. For ex-
ample, if blocs are forming for voting purposes in negotiations,
the fluidity of such blocs may be greater than, for example, if
they were forming to fight together in war. This fluidity factor
is very important in the following discussion of bloc formation in
the Law of the Sea negotiations. Groups of nations have clustered
differently as each issue emerges in importance and as time passes
and more knowledge is gained about critical problems.
However, although groups of nations have changed their alleg-
iance to each other from time to time, certain clusters of nations
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id.
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entered into negotiations with some fundamental similarities which
almost nothing will change; certain nations came into the nego-
tiations with particular situations placing them in a unique role
which neither time nor circumstances would change. Hence, a
group of developing nations, believing that current international
laws were not reflective nor representative of their own interests,
brought with them common complaints which have held them to-
gether on some issues despite significant changes in the interna-
tional environment and despite different national interests. The
United States and the Soviet Union, on the other hand,
while anxious to maintain a status quo-or close to it-and to have
as many nations in agreement with their respective positions,
have not associated themselves with any group or bloc of nations,
but rather have remained loners throughout the entire period of
negotiations. Finding themselves often in agreement on many
matters, both of these Great Powers cannot be viewed in any way
aligned with any bloc of nations or with each other on any specific
issue. Each has its own position, offers its own draft resolutions,
draft treaties and proposals, and each has tried to attain its policy
objectives through separate means.
Before looking at specific blocs and patterns of alliances which
formed in the U.N. Sea-bed Committee during the negotiations, it
is useful to examine the basis for some of the divisions. Of partic-
ular relevance here are geographic, socio-political, economic and
military considerations.
Geography
Geographic factors alone have provided a strong basis for divi-
sions in the negotiations. Specific geophysical characteristics have
determined certain positions. A nation with a broad continental
shelf would perhaps support a territorial limit based on size of
its shelf or a depth limit. A nation with a narrow continental
shelf and few resources might support narrow territorial juris-
diction in order to benefit from resource allocations from else-
where.
Geographic location has also played a key role in the formation
of regional alliances, such as the African states, Asian states, the
Latin American bloc and the Caribbean nations. Even the Indian
Ocean countries have attempted their own alliance.
Economics
Economic differences have probably played the most important
role in bringing nations together on various issues. Those nations
already benefiting from the current arrangements are reluctant
to see things change very much, while those nations who are just
beginning to develop find the current rules place them at a disad-
vantage with regard to access to the resources of the seas. They
want changes-changes which not only make conditions more
equitable for them, but changes which will give them some advan-
tage, since many of these states believe that the developed world
owes them some assistance.
Politics
Differences in political position in the international system have
also dictated certain positions. Some nations have taken positions
just to draw attention to themselves as they assert leadership with-
in a particular regional group. Others, like the United States,
anxious to maintain a world leadership role while seeking some
compromise, also maintain certain non-negotiable positions so as
to protect their edge.
Military
Closely related to political position and interests is the difference
in military interests. The larger maritime powers have big navies
which they are anxious to protect. With the growing importance
of sea power as an arena for strategic/geopolitical operations,
these larger maritime nations maintain certain positions which will
protect the sovereignty of their navies, while others without large
military fleets are not anxious to give such freedom to these nations.
Functional
Finally functional interests have dictated varying positions.
Nations with large fisheries off of their coasts are anxious to pro-
tect these fisheries from foreign exploitation. Nations with distant
water fishing capabilities are anxious to keep these same waters
open for exploitation. Nations with large mineral deposits off their
coastlines on their continental shelves are determined to assert
their rights over the minerals. Nations with investments in off-
shore technologies with capabilities for exploiting resources are
wanting returns on their investments. At the same time, those
nations without either the technological capabilities or the capital
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to invest, are anxious to share in some way in the exploitation of
resources.
These and many more factors which separate one state or set
of states from one another have formed the foundations for con-
flicting positions in the Law of Sea negotiations.
Tim TssuEs/THE ALi&ANcES
The first issue which divided the nations who attended the first
sessions of preparatory meetings was what they should discuss in
the negotiations. The United States took a very firm stand that
these negotiations should be of a -limited nature; that there were
so many different kinds of problems needing resolution, each re-
quiring extensive attention. 6 Also, some issues were more ripe for
resolving than others. However, a large group of nations, es-
pecially the bloc of developing states, believed that all of the issues
were intertwined and could not be discussed separately. Hence,
they insisted that the negotiations include discussions of all the
issues surrounding the law of the sea. Determining the list of
topics was a lengthy and agonizing procedure. The final list (see
appendix) includes much redundancy and evidences much hair-
splitting in the compromises. However, six inter-related topics can
be identified: 1) the territorial sea; 2) the economic zone; 3) inter-
national straits; 4) the international regime; 5) marine pollution;
6) scientific research and technical assistance.
Territorial Limits
Historically, the concept of the freedom of the seas has been
threatened often and to varying degrees. Less than 200 years ago,
coastal states asserted control over a three-mile limit of territorial
seas. Most of these claims were limited to specific interests such
as fishing, protection from naval encroachments from foreign
powers and the protection of national security and economic in-
terests.7
Although these claims were made, freedom of the seas was not
entirely abolished-foreign vessels still enjoyed the right of inno-
6. Address by Richard KV Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed,
May 23, 1970. 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 806 (1970).
7. Sohn (Chairman), Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
23d Report, THE UNirTED NATIONS AND Tm OcEANs 17 (1973).
cent passage through the territorial sea. However, activities such
as fishing or anything posing a military threat were forbidden in
that area. Some states, however, also began claiming broader areas
of the sea for specific purposes such as fishing or preventing cus-
toms problems.
Finally, in the late nineteenth century, there was some recog-
nition of broadened powers within the territorial sea, itself, in-
cluding the all-embracing concept that that area should be con-
sidered as part of the national territory of the coastal state.
Attempts to reconcile differences over the breadth of the terri-
torial sea have been unsuccessful up until now. The Codification
Conference at The Hague in 1930, the Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960 failed in their attempts to do
so. The latter conference, however, was able to establish a maxi-
mum of twelve miles for a contiguous zone for enforcing customs
and several other types of regulations.8
For the past twenty years, states have been extending their terri-
torial jurisdictions, some even as far as 200 miles. This threat to
the freedom of the seas has created a world-wide concern. After
much negotiation in the past several years, it seems that agreement
might be reached on a twelve-mile territorial sea, extending total
jurisdiction of the coastal state out to the previous limits of its
contiguous zone. Of course, one must remember, that only a rela-
tively few nations signed that Geneva Convention in 1964, so that
this concept of a twelve-mile limit may be much more limiting
to some than to others. With the extension of this jurisdiction,
if it comes about, the United States has proposed that the concept
of innocent passage as is currently required in the territorial sea
be extended to connote more the concepts of freedom of naviga-
tion. However, this is a proposal which is very controversial at
this time.9 Nations fearing military threats from large foreign
powers are reluctant to give blanket permission to nations who
would freely use their navies for belligerent acts, traversing their
territorial waters for access to the shores of another belligerent.
Different aspects of this issue concern specific states. For ex-
ample, Greece is concerned with boundaries being drawn to include
all of its islands as part of the coastal state from which its territorial
sea is determined, whatever the limits. One proposal states that
8. Id. at 13.
9. See Knight, U.S. Oceans Policy: Perspective 1973, reprinted from
PnOCEEDnGs oF THE 20T ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF I n.xRAL LAw 24-6 (1973).
Also see Statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of Seabed
Committee, July 28, 1972 for official U.S. position.
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"Historic Rights" and "Historic Bays" should be safeguarded if they
happen, under new regulations, to fall under the jurisdiction of
another state.'0
The breadth of the territorial sea of an archipelagic state has
become another aspect of this issue. A group or bloc of nations,
including Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, the Phillippines, and the Decla-
ration of the Organization of African Unity supported the proposal
that the territorial sea of an archipelagic state whose component
parts or islands form an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity be regarded as such and be measured from the
straight baselines joining the furthest points of the islands. Uru-
guay also made a similar proposal." The United States shares
an archipelagic problem with the state of Hawaii, but has taken
no official position regarding it as of this time.
The United States has indicated it might agree to a territorial
sea of 12 nautical miles, measured in accordance with the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.12
Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, the Netherlands,
Singapore, Santo Domingo, the Soviet Union, Colombia, Mexico,
and Argentina have supported to differing degrees the 12-mile
territorial limit. However, Uruguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, and
Peru have supported territorial limits out as far as 200 nautical
miles.' 3
The Economic Zone: Coastal Fisherie& and Minerals
Much of the debate in the law of the sea preparatory meetings
has been over ownership of the resources in the sea. Since most
of the resources lie in or near coastal areas, each state has recog-
nized the importance of laying claim to resources off its coast.
What resources and what limits have been the issues. The eco-
nomic zone or resource zone which most nations are claiming al-
10. U.N. Doc. SC II/WG/Paper No. 4, 2.1, at 3; 2.2, at 4.
11. Id. 2.3.1, at 5.
12. Statement of John R. Stevenson, Subcommittee II of Seabed Com-
mittee, July 28, 1972.
It is our candid assessment that there is no possibility for agreement
on the breadth of the territorial sea other than twelve nautical
miles.
See also SC/WG/Paper No. 4, 2.3.2, at 12.
13. See U.N. Doc. SC II/WG/Paper No. 4, 2.3.2, at 14-15 for Brazil draft
article and Ecuador, Panama, Peru draft articles. "
ready or are proposing to claim range up to and beyond 200 miles
and have been stated in terms of depth, distance, and exploitability
of the continental shelf and margins. Argentina, Australia, New
Zealand, Uruguay and Brazil have indicated informally that the
zone could extend even further. Currently, under the 1958 Conti-
nental Shelf Convention, Argentina and Australia can claim seabed
resources to at least 200 miles because of their extensive shelves.
However, there are only six nations who benefit directly from an
economic zone of more than 200 miles. The African states, except
for South Africa, have supported agreement on a 200 mile eco-
nomic zone. Some of the Latin American nations have wavered
over supporting the 200 mile-plus proposals,. Argentina and
Brazil seem to represent the two positions, as they vie for the
leadership of the Latin group. Mexico, Norway, and Australia have
taken up the roles of mediators between the entire range of
positions with some hope of gaining agreement. More specifically,
Mexico, Columbia, and Venezuela appear as the mediators for the
Latin countries. On the whole, the Caribbean, Latin, and African
states agree to something approaching a 200 mile economic zone,
although the Caribbean states have indicated they might support
a position of more than 200 miles.14
Actually, the United States stands to benefit from -a 200 mile
economic zone except at its boundary in the Arctic, where its conti-
nental shelf, probably containing oil, extends to more than 400
miles at some points. The U.S. might do well to support the posi-
tion of either a 200 mile zone or the continental margin, whichever
goes further.
The Soviet Union has proposed a depth limit of 500 meters,
which for it turns out to be better than 200 miles. Canada also
happens to prefer this proposal because it has a large drop-off to
400 meters near its coastline.15
The major differences in the interpretation of the economic zone
are best reflected in the two proposals-one for a patrimonial sea,
an area representing total coastal state jurisdiction; and the matri-
monial sea, a zone consisting of regional sharing.16 The United
States has proposed a trust zone over which the coastal state has
jurisdiction over the resources in that area but shares some of the
revenue from the resources with the "international regime," what-
ever it happens to be.17
14. Interview with Legal Consultant, U.S. delegation.
15. Id.
16. SC/WG/Paper No. 4, 6.1, at 1-2.
17. U.S. Draft Articles 1 and 2, sub par. (d) and (e), see Id. 6.2, at 12.
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The Patrimonial Sea proposed in the Santo Domingo Declaration,
in the draft articles of Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela gives sov-
ereign rights to the coastal state over "the renewable and non-
renewable resources?' which are found in the waters, in the sea-
bed and in the subsoil of an area adjacent to the territorial sea
called the patrimonial sea.18
Several states have proposed 'articles to protect special interests
in this economic zone. For example, Canada, India, Kenya, Sene-
gal, Sri Lanka and Australia have proposed exclusive fishing zones
off their coasts to protect them from foreign infringements. How-
ever, the issues over fisheries are complex. There is a proposal
to limit coastal jurisdiction over particular species of fish. While
the Latin American nations of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have tried
to enforce an exclusive fishing zone off their coasts for many years,
the African nations are now joining the Latins for an exclusive
fishing zone, prompted by discoveries of large fisheries off the West
Coast of Africa. There is belief that if the United States and
the Latin countries can reach an agreement on fisheries, the Afri-
can and Asian nations will follow. However, the West African
coast is cut into many pieces and licensing becomes a nuisance as
schools of fish cross coastal limits. Thus, regional sharing of fish-
eries would probably be more efficient. Regional sharing might
also solve the problem of the landlocked: nations who have been
guaranteed access and right to fish. They would then be fishing
in regional waters, if the coastal states could agree.
International Straits and Special Interests
Passage through straits has become one of the most unresolvable
issues up to now. The United States is attempting to obtain a
broad definition of "innocent passage" to include rights of free
transit, thus satisfying both military and commercial needs. If ter-
ritorial limits were extended beyond current limits, several key
straits previously under international control would fall under
the territorial jurisdiction of a coastal state and be subject to their
regulations. The United States and the other large maritime na-
tions are concerned that access to these straits remain free and
18. Id. 6.1, at 1-2.
that special regulations protect these straits under international
regulation.10
Three sets of states are directly involved in this problem: 1)
Spain would like to have jurisdiction over the Straits of Gibralter.
Egypt and its Arab neighbors are concerned about the Straits of
Tehran; 2) those archipelagic states and those states in sympathy
with them have several key straits which would fall within their
territorial limits, e.g. Malacca. Indonesia, Phillippines, Mauritius,
Fiji, and probably New Guinea are all part of a bloc of nations
on this issue; 3) states with special interests. Italy, Finland, Swe-
den, Tanzania and a few others have small straits less than six miles
wide over which they have ,claimed historic jurisdiction. While of-
ficially closed to international regulation, these states have coop-
erated by allowing ships to pass freely. However, they now fear
they will be included in any blanket agreement on straits and are
attempting to prevent this from happening.20
The International Regime
Once territorial limits are established and agreement reached on
an economic zone, the area left to the "Common Heritage of Man-
kind," will require some supervision. Whether it is merely a titular
organ, or a regulatory body, such as a -licensing authority, or
whether it takes the form of a joint venture operation are ques-
tions under current consideration. Whether this "regime" would
have much power, who would control it, and what it could do
are problems now being negotiated.
Many of the developing states, and the Scandanavian states as
well, support a regime controlled by the U.N. General Assembly.21
The larger maritime powers are more in favor of such a regime
being under the control of the Security Council. The resolution
of this question will partially determine the character of the reg-
ime. The major issue influencing much of the debate is who will
control the resources of the high seas-those resources belonging
to everyone. Actually manganese nodules and fisheries are the
only financially profitable resources in that area at this time, and
fisheries agreements will probably be handled regionally, although
19. See John R. Stevenson statement, Subcommittee II of Seabed Com-
mittee, July 28, 1972,
The United States and others have also made it clear that
their vital interests require that agreement on a twelve mile
territorial sea be coupled with agreement on free transit of straits
used for international navigation and these remain basic elements
of our national policy which we will not sacrifice.
20. U.N. Doc. SC II/WG/Paper No. 4, 2.2 at 4.
21. Interview with consultant to Department of State, Fall, 1973.
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there may be some international coordination. Nevertheless, that
leaves authority over the mining of manganese nodules as the pri-
mary job for the international regime.
This problem has several dimensions. There are less than a doz-
en companies that have invested in the mining of the nodules.
The Summa Corporation, Ocean Mining Division (formerly Hughes
Tool); Kennecott Copper Corporation; Deepsea Ventures, Inc. a
subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc.; and International Nickel Co., are the
American companies working on deep sea mining. Sumitomo
Group/MITI, a Japanese consortium with financial support from
more than 52 firms from six countries; Deep Ocean Minerals As-
sociation (DOMA), a group of 27 Japanese firms; AMR, a West
German group; CNEXO in France; and perhaps even the Soviet
Union may be commencing work on manganese nodule mining.22
Although only a few groups plan to exploit the nodules, there
are several problems: 1) how to assure that the rest of the inter-
national community can benefit from their exploitation since they
are in territory belonging to all states; 2) how guarantees can be
provided for those companies that want to make large investments
in the mining of the nodules.
The private corporations would prefer to have a weak interna-
tional regime with licensing authority and no more since they are
sensitive to interference in their management practices. 23 How-
ever, a license authority would not provide guarantees to protect
these companies, since such an organization would have no protec-
tion or enforcement powers. However, a new proposal has been
,offered in the past year that the international regime take the
form of an enterprise. That is, the international regime would
enter into joint venture with those companies wishing to exploit
the nodules, thereby gaining vested interests in the operation, shar-
ing in the management and revenues, while becoming the unex-
pected ally of the corporation. While mining corporations view
this proposal with much skepticism and suspicion, fearing any con-
trols, there may be an outside chance they would ultimately allow
their respective delegations to accept some similar plan which
would then give them some of the guarantees they need and the
22. U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/90, UNGA, Sea-Bed Mineral Resources: Recent
Developments 10-14 (July 3, 1973).
23. See Senate Bill S.2801, for position of U.S. minerals industry.
rest of the international community some of the guarantees they
have sought.
Marine Pollution
The seas have been used -as the ultimate dumping grounds for
society's wastes for centuries. However, the rapid growth of
populations and industries throughout the world is putting extra
heavy burdens on the seas, and it looks as if this practice cannot
continue forever without irreparably damaging the environment.
The Inter-governmental. Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) as well as other international bodies have begun an attack
on marine pollution. There are a number of obstacles to resolving
this situation. First, a world-wide monitoring network should be
implemented to make available information on pollutants and
problem areas. Second, it may be necessary to restrict certain ac-
tivities which are determined dangerous to coastal or marine eco-
systems. There is also the question of landbased pollutants which
affect the oceans. What can be done? The inequitable distribution
of wealth among nations suggests that some plan must be devised
to satisfy all of these conditions, which enables developing coun-
tries to participate in international environmental programs with-
out adversely affecting their systems of values and their present
or future development potentials. 24 This last consideration has
posed the most difficult problems. While many from the develop-
ing nations agree that the world should be concerned with marine
pollution, they also think that the developed nations should bear
the financial burdens. Hence, while they favor setting interna-
tional standards for pollution, they want the right to depart from
those standards within their own coastal waters. There are really
several blocs of nations on this issue. Canada, Australia and Nor-
way plus others from the developing world feel the industrialized
world should bear the cost burdens. Some of these nations also
wish to depart from international standards within their own wa-
ters. Canada, however, has chosen to make its standards higher
than current international standards, and so stands apart from
others on this matter. The position of the developing states is
understandable, however, in good business terms. On balance,
companies will go where it is cheapest for them, since they are inter-
ested in the return on their investments. Thus, ships will dock
in harbors that do not have costly environmental regulations, and
corporations will build where extra costs are not a problem. How-
24. Knight, supra note 9, at 28.
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ever, due to the nature of ship building -and the expenses associated
with running a ship, there cannot be differing regulations from
port to port. Therefore, certain international standards are neces-
sary.
Scientific Research and Technical Assistance
Scientific research has evolved into a significant issue in recent
months. The problem is that scientists from developed nations
wish to continue to carry out distant-water oceanographic research
without political obstacles. The fear that an extension of the terri-
torial sea and the addition of an economic zone will preclude or
badly hinder their access to near-coastal areas has been voiced by
oceanographers around the world. The real problem, however, is
that the developing nations and a few developed states without
vested interests in distant water research do not view scientific
research as a neutral activity. They see it as a possible threat to
their economic development and perhaps even to national security.
Lack of scientific and technical expertise precludes their efficient
use of information gathered by scientists from foreign countries,
even if that information is freely distributed to them. They need
more than the information. They need the capability to use and
apply that knowledge for social and economic benefit. Thus, the
question of technical assistance has become closely tied to that of
scientific research. Unfortunately, the scientists have no direct in-
fluence over transfers of technology. That area of foreign policy
rests in the hands of government and industry. Whether this issue
has been used more as a bargaining lever by officials on both sides,
or whether it has become a very real problem is difficult to deter-
mine. Nevertheless, the United States is moving toward making
commitments to help developing countries in some way, although
little is understood just how the developed nations can assist them.
One fact has become clear: most nations want to maintain juris-
diction over their economic zones to control scientific research as
well as pollution.2r Thus, this probably means that scientists will
have to make some extra efforts, and even compromises, to do their
research.
25. See discussion, Report of the Committee, supra note 2, at 75-81.
CONCLUSIONS
Patterns of alliances and bloc formations in the Law of the Sea
negotiations have followed an interesting path.
The major split at the inception of the meetings between "have"
and "have not" nations does not seem to have changed markedly,
although information inputs through the learning process have
been immense throughout.
As the issues have become better defined over time, sub-blocs
have changed partners to a limited extent. For example, the land-
locked states which formed a bloc originally are instead beginning
to follow the positions of their regional groups on some issues,
recognizing their interests in gaining access to their nearest coastal
areas.
The original bloc formations, particularly the large bloc of "third
world" Asian, African, and Latin American countries have been
very effective as a voting force against the industrialized maritime
states on numerous issues, particularly the "economic zone." How-
ever, with much of the framework for international arrangements
pounded out, with specific interests at stake, and with the time for
final negotiation fast approaching, some of the unity of this large
group of nations may be breaking down. Separate national inter-
ests, based on differing economic positions, have split some of the
old voting blocs and created new, smaller ones. At the same time,
some of the regional blocs, for example, the African states and the
Latin American states, have strengthened.
Nationalism may be playing a perdictable role. However, the na-
ture of the negotiations may inhibit the process and give greater
continuity to bloc formation. The "package deals," being worked
out between blocs of nations, for example, narrow territorial limits
for wide economic zones and may make breaking away from a bloc
of states more difficult.
Finally, the nature of the bargaining process is such that nations
will hold their best "cards" until the last. What will happen
when those "cards" are played is difficult to assess. An overriding
influence on the final outcome is the extent nations really want
agreement. Some issues will probably be resolved satisfactorily
while other issues will remain unresolved for many years or until
enough nations decide they want agreement.
This paper was presented to a special seminar on the Oceans, sponsored
by the Naval War College, in October, 1973.
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APPEDIx
List of Subjects and Issues Relating to the Law of the Sea
1. International Regime for the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
National Jurisdiction
1.1 Nature and Characteristics
1.2 International Machinery: Structure, Functions, Powers
1.3 Economic Implications
1.4 Equitable Sharing of Benefits Bearing in Mind the Special In-
terests and Needs of the Developing Countries, whether Coastal
or Land-Locked.
1.5 Definition and Limits of the Area Footnote'
(Footnote' To be considered in the light of the procedural agree-
ment as set out in paragraph 22 of the report of the committee
(A/8421).)
1.6 Use Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes
2. Territorial Sea
2.1 Nature and Characteristics, Including the Question of the Unity
or Plurality of Regimes in the Territorial Sea
2.2 Historic Waters
2.3 Limits
2.3.1 Question of the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea: Various
Aspects Involved
2.3.2 Breadth of the Territorial Sea. Global or Regional Criteria. Open
Seas and Oceans, Semi-Enclosed Seas and Enclosed Seas
2.4 Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea
2.5 Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Resulting From the Question
of Plurality of Regimes in the Territorial Sea
3. Contiguous Zone
3.1 Nature and Characteristics
3.2 Limits
3.3 Rights of Coastal States with Regard to National Security, Customs
and Fiscal Control, Sanitation and Immigration Regulations
4. Straits Used for International Navigation
4.1 Innocent Passage
4.2 Other Related Matters Including the Question of the Right of
Transit
5. Continental Shelf
5.1 Nature and Scope of the Sovereign Rights of Coastal States Over
the Continental Shelf. Duties of States
5.2 Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf: Applicable Criteria
5.3 Questions of the Delimitation Between States: Various Aspects
Involved
5.4 Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf
5.5 Regime for Waters Superjacent to the Continental Shelf
5.6 Scientific Research
6. Exclusive Economic Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea
6.1 Nature and Characteristics, Including Rights and Jurisdiction of
Coastal States in Relation to Resources, Pollution Control and
Scientific Research in the Zone. Duties of States
6.2 Resources of the Zone
6.3 Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
6.4 Regional Arrangements
6.5 Limits: Applicable Criteria
6.6 Fisheries
6.6.1 Exclusive Fishery Zone
6.6.2 Preferential Rights of Coastal States
6.6.3 Management and Conservation
6.6.4 Protection of Coastal State's Fisheries in Enclosed and Semi-
Enclosed Seas
6.6.5 Regime of Islands Under Foreign Domination and Control in
Relation to Zones of Exclusive Fishing Jurisdiction
6.7 Sea-Bed Within National Jurisdiction
6.7.1 Nature and Characteristics
6.7.2 Delineation Between Adjacent and Opposite States
6.7.3 Sovereign Rights Over Natural Resources
6.7.4 Limits: Applicable Criteria
6.8 Prevention and Control of Pollution and Other Hazards to the
Marine Environment
6.8.1 Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal States
6.9 Scientific Research
7. Coastal State Preferential Rights or Other Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction
Over Resources Beyond the Territorial Sea
7.1 Nature, Scope and Characteristics
7.2 Sea-Bed Resources
7.3 Fisheries
7.4 Prevention and Control of Pollution and Other Hazards to the
Marine Environment
7.5 International Cooperation in the Study and Rational Exploitation
of Marine Resources
7.6 Settlement of Disputes
7.7 Other Rights and Obligations
8. High Seas
8.1 Nature and Characteristics
8.2 Rights and Duties of States
8.3 Question of the Freedoms of the High Seas and Their Regulation
8.4 Management and Conservation of Living Resources
8.5 Slavery, Piracy, Drugs
8.6 Hot Pursuit
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9. Land-Locked Countries
9.1 General Principles of the Law of the Sea Concerning the Land-
Locked Countries
9.2 Rights and Interests of Land-Locked Countries
9.2.1 Free Access To and From the Sea: Freedom of Transit, Means
and Facilities for Transport and Communications
9.2.2 Equality of Treatment in the Ports of Transit States
9.2.3 Free Access to the International Sea-Bed Area Beyond Na-
tional Jurisdiction
9.2.4 Participation in the International Regime, Including the Machin-
ery and the Equitable Sharing in the Benefits of the Area
9.3 Particular Interests and Needs of Developing Land-Locked Coun-
tries in the International Regime
9.4 Rights and Interests of Land-Locked Countries in Regard to
Living Resources of the Sea
10. Rights and Interests of Shelf-Locked States and States with Narrow
Shelves or Short Coastlines
10.1 International Regime
10.2 Fisheries
10.3 Special Interests and Needs of Developing Shelf-Locked States
and States with Narrow Shelves or Short Coastlines
10.4 Free Access To and From the High Seas
11. Rights and Interests of States with Broad Shelves
12. Preservation of the Marine Environment
12.1 Sources of Pollution and Other Hazards and Measures to Combat
Them
12.2 Measures to Preserve the Ecological Balance of the Marine En-
vironment
12.3 Responsibility and Liability for Damage to the Marine Environ-
ment and to the Coastal State
12.4 Rights and Duties of Coastal States
12.5 International Cooperation
13. Scientific Research
13.1 Nature, Characteristics and Objectives of Scientific Research of
the Oceans
13.2 Access to Scientific Information
13.3 International Cooperation
14. Development and Transfer of Technology
14.1 Development of Technological Capabilities of Developing Coun-
tries.
14.1.1 Sharing of Knowledge and Technology Between Developed and
Developing Countries
14.1.2 Training of Personnel from Developing Countries
14.1.3 Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries
15. Regional Arrangements
16. Archipelagoes
17. Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas
18. Artificial Islands and Installations
19. Regime of Islands:
(A) Islands Under Colonial Dependence or Foreign Domination
or Control
(B) Other Related Matters
20. Responsibility and Liability for Damage Resulting From the Use of the
Marine Environment
21. Settlement of Disputes
22. Peaceful Uses of the Ocean Space: Zones of Peace and Security
23. Archaeological and Historical Treasures on the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
24. Transmission from the High Seas
25. Enhancing the Universal Participation of States in Multilateral Con-
ventions Relating to the Law of the Sea
